Recent developments in understanding the theory and impact of the firm imply new insights into the policy significance of corporate governance. Unlike a market centred approach, a theory based on strategic decision making highlights the form of governance as a central determinant of people's wellbeing. To govern a corporation is to make its strategic decisions and therefore determine its broad impact. Preferences vary over strategy but the consensus is that not all interests are currently being represented, one reason why governance remains very topical. The essential difficulty is a failure to govern in the public interest. As solutions, we consider the design of company law and also more immediate ways forward, focusing on regulation and democratically controlled public agencies to monitor and influence firms' actions. Throughout, the arguments are illustrated using examples from various countries and industries, including education, information technology, football and public utilities in Europe and the US.
I. Introduction
In modern market economies the desirability of 'good governance' is often advocated or given lip service. Who governs and in whose interest is central to economic development. However, what is typically not appreciated is that governance in the public interest requires a form of market economy that is not found in the 'free market'. Whereas the free market implies an elite pursuing their own interests, serving their own objectives despite the resistance of others, governance in the public interest requires increased participation by those affected by the economic process and a constant search for effective democracy. This is the argument that we advance and explore in this paper, which culminates in a discussion of requisite public policy.
The idea of good governance refers to public and private activities, and consequently to governments, public agencies, corporations and other organisations. Our focus is the modern corporation and the paper is therefore a contribution to the long-running debate first raised by Berle and Means (1932) in the context of managerial control in the US corporate sector. Seventy years has not dimmed the controversy and topicality of this subject for economies throughout the world. For example, take-overs, antitrust actions and privatisation policies routinely raise disputed and fundamental issues that are central to peoples' wellbeing. These are essentially issues of corporate governance.
The recent US$1 billion attempt to take-over Manchester United plc by BSkyB, 40 per cent owned by News International, the parent of which is News Corporation, illustrates the point. Manchester United attracts perhaps more attention world-wide than any other football club, whereas News Corporation has assets of nearly US$40 billion and media activities across numerous countries of the Americas, Asia, Australasia and Europe. 1 Correspondingly, there is a wide-ranging set of interest groups in each of the firms. If News Corporation had gained control of Manchester United, the football club would have been governed for the benefit of (the controllers of) News Corporation, thus triggering concerns amongst other interest groups. For example, fans that were also shareholders expressed fears that News Corporation would see football as like any other form of television entertainment, whereas for them the source of its appeal is the active participation of spectators in a live production process. 2 The significance of governance can also be illustrated in the context of (to mention two of any number of possibilities) the Microsoft antitrust action in the US and the privatisation of railways across Europe. Is Microsoft governed with the interests of internet users appropriately taken into account, given that it denied equipment manufacturers the option of selling with a browserless version of Windows? 3 Are users suitably represented in the governance of railways,
given that recent safety problems on Britain's privatised network arguably stem from a structure of industry governance based on the track and trains being controlled by different interests? 4 In revisiting corporate governance, our particular interest is to take into consideration recent developments in understanding the theory and impact of the firm, and therefore of public policy. It is our contention that positioning governance in the context of a broader appreciation of the theory of the firm provides insights into its implications.
The paper's particular focus is on the strategic decision-making approach. Drawing on existing literature, we suggest that modern corporations are hierarchies where strategic decisions are of special significance, where the ability to make those decisions constitutes control, the ability to govern, and where in practice control rests with an elite pursuing their narrow self-interest to the detriment of others. This strategic decision-making approach is associated with a perspective on policy that 2 Shareholder fans argued: "The potential take-over … and similar transactions involving other [football] clubs and media companies across … Europe may trigger a change in the structure of [football] as a commercial entertainment activity and as a professional sport. It is difficult to see how these changes could enhance the underlying value of clubs like Manchester United. The attraction of [football] as a spectator sport lies deep in the culture and traditions of sport. It involves the level of engagement of the individual (far more so than a film for example), and the essential competitiveness and unpredictability of on field results. The excitement and engagement generates demand, and that generates revenues. Large scale consolidation or domination of football clubs could reduce competition and erode local rivalries threatening the popularity of football as a mass entertainment" (Shareholders United Against Murdoch, "BSkyB and Manchester United plc. An analysis of the Offer", distributed as part of a press release, 20 th October 1998). 3 See the findings of fact reported in United States of America v. Microsoft Corporation, Civil Action Number 98-1232 (TPJ) , United States District Court for the District of Columbia. 4 Following a train crash because of worn rails, The Financial Times reported: "So now we know the main causes of worn rails, the new epidemic on the railways. An engineers' report … blamed more frequent, faster and smoother-running trains, wheels and rails that do not fit, and less maintenance. Though no single factor is the sole cause, the issue goes to the heart of fears about safety following privatisation. The problems occur at exactly the point where the industry was divided -where the emphasises economic democracy. Accordingly, we suggest that if the interests of people in general are to be accounted for, if strategic decisions are to be taken in the public interest, then the governance process needs to be characterised by increased participation and effective democracy. Voice and influence is needed for the smaller shareholders in football companies where those shareholders have particular interests in football; consumers in Microsoft require representation and power, as do the users of railways. Achieving these and similar outcomes would require purposive public policies, building on existing and long-standing initiatives yet taking market economies in radically new directions. They cannot be achieved within free market processes because of fundamental imperfections, and although regulation might furnish immediate ways forward it is unable to provide an optimal outcome.
To pursue these arguments, the next Section outlines and discusses corporate governance and the strategic decision-making approach whilst Section III centres attention on democracy and the public interest. Throughout, our comments are illustrated from various industries and countries, depicting the generality of the argument. The illustrations are necessarily brief and somewhat arbitrary but they provide pointers to possibly fruitful empirical investigations of the significance of corporate governance and the public interest.
II.
Governance of a centre of strategic decision making
II.i Strategy 5
In mainstream economic theory the firm is conceptualised using a market centred approach, implying a market centred view of policy. The starting-point for this and perhaps all economic analysis of the firm is Coase (1937) . He sees 'markets' and 'firms' as alternative ways to co-ordinate production. Coase defines a firm (in a pure sense) as the means of co-ordinating production without using market exchange, and explores why markets are sometimes "superseded". 6 This definition is in harmony with analyses of firms' impact that are also market orientated and leads to policy wheels, owned by the train operating companies, meet the track, owned by Railtrack" (20 th January 2001). On railways and privatisation across Europe more generally, see Parker (1998) . 5 See Cowling and Sugden (1998a) for more details. 6 Coase (1937), p 390. conclusions based on market failure. Corporate governance is not a centre of attention in these conclusions.
In contrast, a different reading of Coase (1937) recognises that his ideas are rooted in microeconomic planning within firms. Although Coase observes that co-ordination by markets entails "planning by individuals" who "experience foresight and choose between alternatives", he is particularly interested in "planning within our economic system which is quite different from … individual planning … and which is akin to what is normally called economic planning".
7 Indeed, he sees firms as islands of economic planning. This suggests the relevance of a recent and extensive literature on strategic decision making in modern corporations, and hence an economic analysis centred on strategic decisions rather than markets.
In modern language, the idea of firms as units of planning translates into that of corporations making strategic decisions that give rise to their corporate strategies, the broad plans that are the crucial determinants of the activities with which they are associated. Moreover, Zeitlin (1974) links strategy to the debate on corporate governance. 8 He argues that the power to control a corporation implies the ability to determine broad corporate objectives, which can be equated with the power to make strategic decisions. Essentially, to make strategic decisions is to plan the overall direction of production and hence govern the corporation. This includes the ability to determine in a broad sense a corporation's relationships with other corporations, its relationships with governments and employees, and its geographical orientation. 9 For example, Microsoft made a strategic decision to charge different prices to different 7 Coase (1937), p 387-388. 8 See Pitelis and Sugden (1986) , drawing on Zeitlin (1974) and conceptualising the control of firms in line with the argument herein. 9 Considering whether management controls a corporation, Zeitlin (1974) contemplates the meaning of "broad corporate policies or objectives". The "applications barrier to entry" refers to "the overwhelming majority of consumers" insisting on a personal computer "operating system for which there already exists a large and varied set of high-quality, full-featured applications, and for which it seems relatively certain that new types of applications and new versions of existing applications will continue to be marketed at pace with those written for other operating systems" (p 14). See also Shepherd's (1997) Becht and Röell (1998) , Scott (1999) , Yafeh (2000) ) highlight the differences between the Anglo-US type of corporate governance with that observed in Japan and Continental Europe. In reality, however, these different structures have only superficial effects on the make-up of the controlling elite and the overall conclusions reached are broadly the same; de facto control of the corporation rests between an elite group of (large) shareholders and the company's senior managers/board. 13 (This is not to deny that countries differ in how the elites behave, because of variation in influence within the elites and/or because of constraints on the elites' freedom for manoeuvre. 14 )
13 Cowling and Tomlinson (2000, 2001 ) present a similar idea and attribute the weakness in the Japanese economy to the concentration of strategic decision making within networks of firms. They go on to say that, in this respect, the Japanese economy shares a fundamental symmetry with recent crises in other forms of industrial organisation, such as Anglo-US capitalism. 14 For example, the Anglo-US system is often argued to suffer from short-termism compared to Continental European and Japanese models, see for example Cosh et al (1990) .
It is said that the two main differences that separate the Anglo-US economies from those of other countries are, first, their corporate ownership structure (with the associated voting patterns) and, second, the prevalence of take-overs. In Japan and Prowse (1990) reports that banks hold over 20% of all outstanding corporate equity in Japan as opposed to 0% in the USA.
16 Becht and Röell (1998) show empirically that this ownership concentration in
Continental Europe is reflected in voting power; they highlight the "extraordinarily high degree of concentration of shareholder voting power in Continental Europe relative to the USA and the UK" as their most salient finding. 17 It would seem that the concentrated ownership (and hence voting) in the Continental European system (together with other factors) means that shareowners are more directly involved in the management of these corporations and so can exert a greater degree of direct control.
18
Japanese firms typically operate within networks of firms, most of which are interrelated transaction partners who have long term relationships with each other.
19 Sheard (1994) notes that the "prevalence of interlocking shareholdings is one of the most striking features of the large Japanese firm. A typical listed firm has … extensive interlocking shareholdings with transaction partners (banks, insurance companies, suppliers, customers, trading companies)".
20
Whilst each of these shareholdings is likely to be individually small, collective ownership within the network constitutes a majority holding. Sheard (1994) goes on to say that the interlocking nature of share ownership within such networks of firms results in "a relatively small number of shareholders being in a position to exercise joint control over any given company. Ownership is both dispersed and concentrated: a listed firm has on average 12,910 shareholders, but between ten and twenty of these could exercise joint control". 21 Therefore, although significantly different, the Japanese corporate model has a similar result to the Continental European model in terms of who controls; shareholder power is concentrated in a small group, which therefore has a significant degree of control over management.
22
However, this does not mean to say that shareholders in the diversely owned Anglo-US companies have no means of influence. Discussing the British system, Holland (1995) highlights the fact that "institutional influence and intervention is normally conducted through co-operative relationships with investee companies. Much of this process of influence and intervention … was conducted away from the public gaze".
23
These inter-organisational contacts are often termed 'relationship investing' and this concept forms part of the notion of 'institutional shareholder activism', i.e.
institutional shareholders having an active interest in their holdings. 24 These concepts have spawned a growing literature looking at how widespread these phenomena are in practice, and their effectiveness. Rubach (1999) reports a survey of equity fund managers and institutional owners in the US by Russell Reynolds Associates. It found the practice of relationship investing to be widespread; nearly half of the surveyed "managers conveyed their organisation's point of view to a board of directors, either verbally or in written form". 25 Indeed, Rubach observes that "institutional owners 20 Sheard (1994) , p 310. 21 Sheard (1994) , p 313. 22 Cowling and Tomlinson (2001) , drawing upon Ruigrok and Van Tulder (1995) , indicate that this process of concentration of shareholder power inside the Japanese corporate grouping is re-enforced by the habit of leading firms within the networks appointing former executives to key positions in lower ranked firms within the same group. This allows the dissemination of corporate strategy. 23 Holland (1995) , p 28. 24 The other aspect of institutional activism is the more traditional methods such as filing shareholder proposals, see Rubach (1999) . 25 Rubach (1999) Porta et al (2000) , p 15. 31 Jenkinson and Mayer (1992) , reporting on the work of Rydqvist (1992) .
voting rights of the company. Therefore, this elite group of shareholders, from a shareholder viewpoint, may be inordinately influential.
32
In other countries, such as the UK, Belgium or Norway, the one-share/one-vote system is favoured. For example, Jenkinson and Mayer (1992) report that only about 1% of companies in the UK has dual-class shares. 33 However, equal voting rights per share is still not enough to ensure that influence becomes widely spread amongst the shareholders. It is argued by Tricker (1997) that "information has always been central to the exercise of power, and so it is with governance power", 34 yet Russell Reynolds Associates (1998) reports that "investors say they do not have enough information".
35
Without the general availability of genuine information, the majority of shareholders cannot effectively monitor management and so they have little or no corporate control.
As Jenkinson and Mayer (1992) report, this problem is compounded by widely dispersed shareholders because "there is little incentive for a shareholder to devote much attention to the monitoring and control of a company if only a minute fraction of the total shareholdings in a firm is held". 36 This therefore means that the large institutional shareowners that regularly meet management (as mentioned above) are the only groups with the incentive and opportunity to access the information needed to monitor management. Consequently the annual general meeting, where all shareholders are in theory supposed to be able to exert some influence over corporate control, fails to provide an appropriate forum for achieving, as Tricker (1997) puts it, "real democratic shareholder control".
37
Tricker (1997) goes on to indicate that there is "a widespread and growing demand for disclosure, transparency, and access to corporate information". 38 It is true that recent events (at least in Britain) have meant an increased role for "non-executive directors 32 The preference for dual-class shares is most likely connected to the concentration of shareholder voting power in Continental Europe, as reported by Becht and Röell (1999) . 33 Jenkinson and Mayer (1992) , reporting on the work of Rydqvist (1992) . 34 Tricker (1997) quo has yet to be fundamentally altered.
It cannot be denied that take-overs are an influence on the corporate governance landscape of the Anglo-US economies. For example, Franks and Mayer (1990) document that in the UK there are approximately double the number of take-overs as there are in France or Germany. Indeed, hostile bids are commonplace in the US and UK but Franks and Mayer (1998) report that there have been only three hostile takeovers in Germany in the post war period, although it has been said that Vodafone's bid in 2000 for Mannesmann will usher in a new era. 40 Many authors (for example Shleifer and Vishny (1997), MacLean, (1999) ) indicate that take-over is important for Anglo-US corporate governance because the threat of such action will have the effect of disciplining management and encouraging them to focus on shareholder value, rather than pursuing their own interests. Where managerial failure actually occurs, take-overs are said to facilitate the replacement of poor management.
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This might initially suggest that there is greater pressure on management in the Anglo-US economies to follow the agenda of the shareholders. However, many authors (see for example, Kester (1992 ), or Schneider-Lenné (1992 ) suggest that the take-over market is not so vigorous in other markets because it is not needed; by their direct and official involvement, large shareholders in Japanese and Continental
European firms have sufficient control of the company. In contrast, it is often argued that in Anglo-US corporations, the real threat of take-over is needed to ensure that the management is effective and that contacts between the larger owners and management prove productive in guiding the long-term path of the corporation.
This means that in the Continental European, Japanese and Anglo-US systems, the end result is that shareholder power rests with an elite, through concentrated Franks and Mayer (1992b) (cited in Jenkinson and Mayer (1992) ) report that, two years following a hostile take-over in Britain, nearly 90% of directors (both executive and non-executive) will have been replaced. ownership, restricted voting practices, restriction of corporate information and active take-over markets.
However, does this elite group of powerful shareholders control the firm? In some respects the answer must be yes and in some respects no. In theory the group of shareholders enjoys formal control of the company. However, as Tirole (2001) puts it, "the allocation of formal control …cannot be the full story".
42
The modern corporation is an immensely complicated (and indeed large) entity and so has to make many strategic decisions. It is unrealistic to expect that all of these decisions are (or can be) made with the understanding of the 'controlling' shareholders. This would seem to indicate that "players without formal control rights actually enjoy substantial control over their organisations".
43 Shareholders will only be involved (either directly or indirectly) with the most important strategic decisions, which leaves senior managers/the board with a high degree of autonomy and thus de facto control. Only when these individuals deviate significantly from the elite shareholders' wishes will the shareholders pull them back into line and exercise their formal power. Therefore it is likely that de facto control of the modern corporation rests somewhere between a subset of (large) shareholders and the company's senior managers/board.
II.iii Implications
The significance of identifying those who govern a corporation is because interests vary across those concerned about, and affected by, a corporation's activities. This variation would be reflected in differences in the impact of corporations because it would be reflected in different strategic decisions. Zeitlin (1974) Zeitlin (1974) , "control is conceptualised … as follows: when the concrete structure of ownership and of intercorporate relationships makes it probable that an identifiable group of proprietary interests will be able to realise their corporate objectives over time, despite resistance, then we may say they have 'control' of the corporation" (p 1091). 45 See, for example, Cowling and Sugden (1998b, 1998c an abuse of power at their expense. It can also be illustrated by the tobacco case.
Presumably smokers who care about their own health would prefer a strategic decision that did not stifle evidence on the harmful effects of a corporation's cigarettes.
Consider also the activities of a corporate university, an educational organisation established by a corporation as part of the corporation, typically operated like other parts and intended to serve the strategic objectives of the corporation.
49 Craig et al (1999) suggest that the "compatibility of corporate strategies and academic enquiry is contestable: in the corporate university one might well imagine conflict between what scholars consider ought to be enquired into, and what the corporate strategy dictates to be the current action plan. Consider, for example, the obvious conflicts between corporate strategies in the tobacco industry and the conduct of research into the health effects of smoking". 50 This raises issues of employee/employer disagreement over strategy, and of conflict with other interested parties. The research conducted in universities might be considered relevant for everyone in society, in which case everyone has an interest in the strategy that determines the content and conduct of that research. The actual research, however, will vary according to who determines the strategy.
Similarly, wider interests in society are in issue with corporate strategies that impact on the environment. For example, the prospect of further oil exploration in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge in northern Alaska is causing widespread concern amongst environmental lobby groups, including Greenpeace and the World Wildlife Fund, and is also raising questions about relationships between corporations and US Presidents.
At issue are the strategic decisions of major oil corporations -BP Amoco, Chevron, ExxonMobil and Phillips Petroleum. 51 It is also argued that concentrated strategic decision making in the communications sector goes to the heart of a society's interest in political, economic and social democracy. Williams (1966) observes that the extension of communications is central to increased democracy but that the twentieth 49 It has been estimated that by 1998 there were over 1000 corporate universities (Sunoo, 1998) ; the number more recently has been put at over 1600 (Dealtry, 2000) . 50 Craig et al (1999) century saw the communications sector governed by ever more sectional interests.
This featured the narrow governance of corporations.
52

II.iv The challenge for public policy
From recognising that there are varied interests in a corporation's activities, and that this would be reflected in different strategies, it follows that corporate governance is a central issue for public policy. It has been argued in this Section that the modern corporation is governed by an elite, only a subset of those with an interest in its activities. This elite governs in pursuit of its own objectives, opting for strategies that other groups would not implement if they were making the decisions. This raises a serious problem if, as a matter of public policy, it is seen as desirable that corporations' activities serve the interests of people in general, that is if it is considered desirable that corporations serve the public interest. The problem is one of strategic failure: concentration of strategic decision-making power in the hands of an elite implies a failure to govern production in the interest of the community at large.
To avoid such failure, an obvious possibility is to search for ways of appropriately involving more and more people affected by strategic decisions in the process of making those decisions, to design ways of democratising governance. 53 An aspect of the latter is to seek more participation and an effective democracy within the strategic decision-making processes of corporations.
54
For market-centred approaches to economic welfare the basis for public policy is market failure rather than strategic failure, and the public interest may be served even if corporations are governed by sectional interests which are left 'free' from government 'interference'. An argument underlying such a view can be seen in extreme form in an Arrow-Debreu type general equilibrium model (see, for example, Debreu (1959) and Arrow and Hahn (1971) ). In this case, the presence of ubiquitous perfect competition ensures Pareto optimal outcomes in situations where producers and indeed all actors pursue their own interests. Less extreme would be the situation 52 See Cowling (1985) for more discussion. 53 Evidence in Frey and Stutzer (2000) suggests that widening involvement in strategic decision making might directly increase people's wellbeing. According to evidence from interview data in Switzerland, "individuals are ceteris paribus happier, the better developed the institutions of direct democracy are in their area of residence" (p 918). 54 For a discussion of the policy implications of strategic failure more generally, not only as regards the governance of large corporations, see Cowling and Sugden (1999) .
where a corporation is governed by sectional interests but where those with other interests can make take-over bids in a competitive capital market or can establish new, competing corporations. The strategic failure analysis, in contrast, is founded on the significance of imperfect competition, a position justified as realistic in the context of modern corporations and the theory of the firm in Cowling and Sugden (1998a) , and explored more generally as regards transnational corporations in Cowling and Sugden (1994) .
In addition, market-centred and strategic failure approaches differ in their respective emphases on voice and exit. This has important implications for the policy challenge.
Hirschman (1970) refers to exit as "the sort of mechanism economics thrives on. It is neat -one either exits or one does not; it is impersonal -any face-to-face confrontation between customer and firm with its imponderable and unpredictable elements is avoided and success and failure of the organisation are communicated to it by a set of statistics; and it is indirect -any recovery on the part of the declining firm comes by courtesy of the Invisible Hand, as an unintended by-product of the customer's decision to shift. In all these respects voice is just the opposite of exit. It is a far more 'messy' concept because it can be graduated, all the way from faint crumbling to violent protest; it implies articulation of one's critical opinions rather than a private, 'secret' vote in the anonymity of the supermarket; and finally, it is direct and straightforward rather than roundabout". 55 However, again in line with Hirschman (1970) , voice is at the heart of concerns with democracy and therefore with strategic failure; the democratic process of its essence entails "the digging, the use, and hopefully the slow improvement" 56 of channels of voice, and "while exit requires nothing but a clearcut either-or decision, voice is essentially an art constantly evolving in new directions". 57 The challenge is to design specific policies that recognise and nurture this constantly evolving art (and that maintain an appropriate mix and balance of voice and exit processes).
55 Hirschman (1970) , p 15-16. 56 Hirschman (1970) , p 17. 57 Hirschman (1970) , p 43.
III. Increased participation and effective democracy
III.i New legislation on corporations
One possibility is to consider the provisions of company law to introduce changes that would widen involvement in strategic decision making. To pursue this we examine English experience as an illustration. 58 We have argued that the existing literature places economic control of the typical large, modern corporation between an elite group of (large) shareholders and senior managers/the company board. In the English legal system this is reflected in certain shareholders being a company's 'members', who elect and in theory monitor the board of directors (see, for example, Farrar and Hannigan (1998) , Mayson et al (1999) and Keenan (2000)): "the two organs of the company recognised by company law are the general meeting of shareholders (which may not necessarily include all the shareholders, since some shares may not carry votes and preference shareholders may have limited voting rights) and the board of directors. The board of directors manages the company and makes business policy decisions and the general meeting of the shareholders as a body elects the board and decides on organic change".
59
The prime duty of directors is to act in the interests of the company but this is essentially equated with the shareholders' interests: "traditionally, this obligation to act bona fide in the interests of the company has been defined as an obligation to act in the interests of the shareholders and it is the directors' subjective opinion as to the interests of the corporators as a general body, balancing the short-term interests of the present members against the long-term interests of future members, which counts".
60
Directors also have duties towards company creditors and employees but these are very much secondary. For example, Keenan (2000) suggests that the statutory duty towards employees "appears to be a declaration of good intent and little more", 61 58 Examination of one country is not to deny the possibility of countries co-operating with each other to pursue change. This option might be interesting in the European Union, building on the history of the Vredeling directive, see European Commission (1980) . 59 Farrar and Hannigan (1998) , p 303. 60 Farrar and Hannigan (1998) , p 381. 61 Keenan (2000) , p.617, which also goes on to suggest that the existing duty to employees "will clearly become of importance if legislation is ever passed requiring companies to have some worker directors on the board, since their central interest would in many cases be that of the employees" (p 617).
although this contrasts with the legal situation in other countries, see Mayson et al (1999) .
62
One possibility is to increase participation in a corporation's strategic decision making by building on the point that senior management must act in the interests of members. The idea is to widen membership beyond shareholder investors, including as members others with an interest in the corporation's activities.
This sort of development has been discussed in earlier literature. Consider, for example, Farrar and Hannigan (1998) and Mayson et al (1999) on the debate regarding the interests of 'stakeholders'. Also Sternberg (1997) and Tirole (2001) on the definition and use of this concept, and Kelly et al (1997) , clearly revealing the very narrow coceptualisation of stakeholding that is adhered to by many. 63 The prospect of senior management having a duty towards all interest groups with a stake in a company has recently been rejected by the Hampel Committee on Corporate
Governance. The Committee concluded: "to redefine the director's responsibilities in terms of the shareholders would mean identifying all the various stakeholder groups;
and deciding the nature and extent of the director's responsibility to each. The result 62 England's "shareholder-centred vision of the company is not universally held among advanced economies. In Germany companies are seen as serving both shareholders and employees, and in German company law this is reflected in the 'co-determination' principle … In Japan a company is seen as a long-term coalition of investors, employees and trading partners, who are all concerned with the company's continuing prosperity. Japan's company law is modelled on Germany's" (Mayson et al, 1999, p 16-17) . This is not to contradict the argument in Section II.ii that economic control rests with an elite in Germany and Japan, rather it is to comment on the formal legal duties of those elite and on the legal constraints that the elites face. Whilst these formalities and constraints need not be irrelevant the focus of this paper is the possibilities for democratising governance, for moving away from governance by an elite towards effective participation by all interested parties. An English legal system in which directors owe a duty to shareholders does not mean that all shareholders are effectively participating in economic governance (a point returned to subsequently in this Section). Similarly, a German or Japanese legal system 'serving employees' does not necessarily mean that employees have economic control. 63 Recently, Will Hutton continued his commentary on the stakeholder idea, arguing that "shareholders property rights are not absolute, that those shareholders live in society too, and the exercise of their rights is subject to the claims of others". To this end he suggests that "corporate law should widen the number of stakeholders who have a legitimate claim on decision-making" (The Observer, 9 th April 2000). Hutton is also a contributor to Kelly et al (1997) . He favours social and economic inclusion but then argues that the big question is where the market should end and the relationships of inclusion begin. Our analysis does not recognise this border, instead suggesting that inclusion needs to be the fundamental determinant of the nature and form of all relationships, including market relationships. Also interesting is the contribution to Kelly et al by John Kay. He proposes new company legislation that would essentially give incumbent managers increased powers to shape the future of the corporation in their image, for example implying effective protection from the attentions of hostile take-over raiders. This would imply a concentration of power, an absence of democracy, that is counter to the implications of our analysis.
would be that the directors were not effectively accountable to anyone since there would be no clear yardstick for judging their performance. This is a recipe neither for good governance nor for corporate success". 64 Nevertheless, in the light of the economic argument outlined herein, this issue is far from closed. It is curious, moreover, that whilst some consider it appropriate for a corporation to be governed in the interests of only one amongst a set of stakeholders, the same is not considered appropriate for a nation. According to the Hampel Committee, the directors of a particular company would not be accountable to anyone if they owed significant duties to shareholders and to others. Yet it is commonly argued that a national government is in some sense accountable to a national electorate, an electorate made up of many varied and diverse interests.
The exact way that the widening of membership is achieved and how company directors are bestowed with attainable duties towards all those members is something that would need imaginative consideration, and it is likely something that would need to be developed and evolved over time, learning from experience. The same process could not be uniformly applied to every corporation: each sector (and perhaps corporation) has unique considerations that need to be taken into account. In general, however, it would be infeasible to attempt to provide all interests with an appropriate voice in the strategic decision-making process simultaneously, and one option is to build from the current position by focussing attention in turn on particular sectors and groups. For example, the effective democratisation of governance requires appropriate communication amongst interested parties, itself necessitating a communications sector that is democratically controlled. Perhaps communications should therefore be a prioritised sector. 65 As for different groups, one possibility might be to concentrate in the first instance on employees or, depending on the sector involved, the initial focus might be on consumers. Within this there could be further narrowing by concentrating on interests especially committed to a particular corporation, or especially dependent. Perhaps employees who have a long association with the company or those who rely heavily on the company's services, for example railway season ticket holders or those captive to a monopoly, such as a water supplier.
There are difficulties in developing a practical process that broadens membership and allows effective corporate governance. One of the most significant of these is the allocation of votes for electing the board of directors, since this needs to be done in a way that enables real power sharing while ensuring workability. For example, to have a situation where each 'new' member has a vote in conjunction with one vote per share would give a significantly different result to a system with one member one vote. Indeed in either of these situations it could be the case that one membership group (for example, shareholders) would be capable of swamping others (for example, consumers and employees), depending on the numbers involved. Existing
English law means that buying shares generally implies buying votes and therefore, perhaps, a degree of control over the strategic decision-making process. Again, this is strikingly different from what is widely perceived as appropriate for the governance of a country. The use of money to buy votes in British parliamentary elections was eradicated in the nineteenth century, even though a similar system still persists in the governance structure of publicly owned corporations.
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Another difficulty is to determine the criteria by which new members are identified.
This would not be an easy process. A significant membership fee might be desirable as this might be seen as a cost that only those with a significant interest in the corporation would incur. 67 The fee could take many different forms, for example a one-time payment returnable on the decision to cease being a member. To reduce the exclusion of those with relatively less wealth, the fee might be paid over time, perhaps via a monthly salary contribution. The fee could then be placed in an interest bearing trust to act like a bank account, giving a guaranteed return disparate from company performance and profits. In this situation, the fee is acting as a bond between the new member and corporation, whist maintaining the distinction between shareholder and other members.
It is, however, unrealistic to assume that every interested party would immediately want to become a member of a company. Although the numbers would differ from sector to sector, in many cases only those few with a special interest would exercise their right. This might be seen to imply broad satisfaction, or at least low levels of dissatisfaction, with the company's existing governance. In times of public dissatisfaction we envisage the right to become members being more highly utilised.
This shifting balance would be a process that helps affect change; following Hirschman (1970) , "a mixture of alert and inert citizens, or even an alternation of involvement and withdrawal, may actually serve democracy better than either total, permanent activism or total apathy". 68 The ability to become a member is important for giving a voice to those who currently have none, even if it appears (at least superficially) that it is not always utilised. It is also the case that the choice to become a member might be influenced by the quantity and quality of available 'performance'
indicators. For electricity, consumers mainly rely on price and the reliability of from company performance, this distinction is not lost. See Knight and Sugden (1990) for more details on this and related issues. 68 Hirschman (1970) , p 32. "One reason … is that the ordinary failure, on the part of most citizens, to use their potential political forces to the full makes it possible for them to react with unexpected vigour -by using normally unused reserves of political power and influence -whenever their vital interests are directly threatened" (p 32 service but for rail travellers there are far more criteria on which to judge -price, delays, cleanliness of rolling stock, journey times and so on. On this basis, electricity customers in California, who have recently faced uncertain supplies, power cuts and steep price rises, would be highly likely to be actively seeking membership.
This example also highlights the fundamental issue of information, commented upon as concerns shareholders in Section II.ii and taken up subsequently in our comments on the communications sector. Membership cannot be effectively widened if information continues to be restricted; interest groups need information so that they can appropriately access the strategic decision-making process. Policy therefore needs to be directed to ensuring that the appropriate information is widely available. As part of this change one possibility is suggested by the proposal for a 'transnational corporations monitoring unit' in Bailey et al (1994) , arguing out of practice and experience in the US and elsewhere. It is suggested that countries introduce monitoring units "designed to collect information on transnationals' performance and impact, to prepare accounts and to use these to influence economic policy and attitudes of and towards transnationals". 71 Although the focus of the argument in Bailey et al (1994) is to aid governments with their dealings with transnational corporations, Bailey et al (1999) suggests that the monitoring unit could act as a 'clearing house' where various interest groups pool their information, allowing widespread dissemination and analysis. Such a system could be readily adapted to assist corporate governance in the public interest. It could be invaluable in helping various interest groups gain the information that they need for a real voice in the governance of modern corporations.
Another issue that policy would need urgently to address is the role of company directors. This would also need to change. Whereas currently in England directors are effectively responsible only to shareholders, we are advocating that they be responsible to many, more varied interests. In fact we have suggested that in practice it is the directors themselves who, with an elite group of shareholders, currently govern the typical corporation. If instead control is to be in the public interest, then 71 Bailey et al (1994) 
III.ii More immediate ways forward
We have briefly indicated some of the issues in company law that must be addressed if there is to be effective economic democracy. The complexity of the issues, however, is indicative of the need for a long-run project that addresses a wider range of considerations if strategic failures are to be overcome and new ways forward are to be found. Meanwhile, it is necessary to ensure that economies progress into the future, in ways which ideally facilitate and which certainly do not undermine longrun, fundamental change towards effective democracy, but also in ways which do not simply await that change.
There are immediate possibilities for regulation, although these cannot be seen as a replacement for policies that introduce a direct and genuine democracy. Regulation is essentially an arms-length response to failures in arms-length relationships, whereas of its essence economic democracy entails inclusive, dynamic processes for shaping preferences and possibilities. When Hirschman (1970) were "concerns for the wider public interest". 75 Only certain mergers qualify for reference to the Commission and the main concern is the effects on domestic competition. The Commission, in investigating, "must take into account all matters that appear to be relevant in considering the public interest but in particular it must have regard to the desirability of maintaining and promoting competition in the UK, of promoting the interests of consumers, purchasers and other users of goods and services in the UK in respect of prices, quality and variety of goods and services; efficiency and innovation, the balanced distribution of industry and employment, and exports".
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For such measures to widen involvement in strategic decision making with real effect, however, it is important that the public interest be explicitly identified in terms of 74 This is a result of Farrar and Hannigan (1998) , p 615, referring to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission. different sub-groups of the public having varied concerns in the strategic direction of a company, where that strategic direction is recognised as the central issue. Serving the public interest needs to be seen in terms of the different interests being represented effectively. Whilst each interest in isolation might prefer a different strategic direction, taking account of all interests requires the search for compromise and consensus, thus a concern with promoting mutual awareness and with mediating a suitable development path.
These are not the considerations that have thus far preoccupied the Commission in Britain. It has tended to adopt a much narrower focus, particularly emphasising competition.
77 Policy surrounding the likes of the Commission is nowadays typically labelled "competition policy", and it is perhaps revealing that when the BSkyB bid was referred it was reported as exceptional that there were concerns about the wider public interest. 78 Even with such recommendations, in its report the Commission "based [its] public interest conclusions mainly on the effect of the merger on competition among broadcasters". 79 A preoccupation with competition is more in line with the market failure, market-centred approach to policy, and insofar as the Commission has an economic rationale it is rooted in the market failure perspective.
Nevertheless, its terms of reference appear quite broad and flexible, the concern with public interest apparently allowing a strategic decision-making approach to economic welfare to be pursued, if there is the necessary political will. Indeed, this is suggested by the Commission in its investigation of the BSkyB proposal: "many of the points put to us went well beyond the competition and consumer concerns that normally arise in merger enquiries. However, in considering this merger we are directed by section 84 of the [Fair Trading Act] to take into account when assessing the public interest 'all matters which appear to [us] to be relevant'. We have therefore looked at these wider football issues".
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It also needs to be recognised that a take-over is not the only occasion when a strategic decision needs to be made. effective merger control would be the evolution of suitable regulatory offices for particularly important sectors in an economy, building on the current practice in a number of countries of having utility regulators. These offices could be charged with safeguarding the public interest in all strategic decision making (albeit control of the public agencies in the public interest would also need to be ensured, itself no foregone conclusion). On occasions there might be tension between a public body concerned with mergers and the public interest, versus one concerned with strategic decisions more generally and the public interest. We suggest that such tension could be creative and fruitful, if appropriately managed, and should neither be feared nor necessarily avoided; its presence, accommodation and deliberate stimulation could be a positive dimension in a process for promoting mutual awareness and for drawing out a suitable development path.
Again, cost considerations alone might mean that it is inappropriate to introduce a regulator for every sector. Again, there are precedents, for example the regulatory offices established to oversee aspects of privatised utilities. Again, the precedents have a competition focus rather than the broader concerns that we are advocating.
However, this also shows that our proposals are not so radically different from current practice as to be infeasible in the immediate future.
IV. Conclusion
Following Coase (1937) and Zeitlin (1974) , the concepts of strategy and governance are central to understanding modern corporations (and other organisations, private and public), their essence, their impact and the design of public policies that affect their activities. Corporations are centres of economic planning; to govern a corporation is to plan its overall direction, to make its strategic decisions and therefore determine its broad impact. We argue that interests vary across those concerned about and affected by a corporation's activities and that this variation is reflected in different preferences over strategy. Accordingly, a corporation's impact typically depends upon who
governs and on what basis they make their decisions. Our principal conclusion is that it is a matter of public policy to ensure that corporate governance is in the public interest. As a basis for action, our analysis is clearly different from the literature's more usual market-centred approach.
Although there is on-going controversy in debates about strategy and governance, there is a consensus that a corporation is typically governed by a subset of those having an interest in its activities. The existing literature places de facto control somewhere between an elite group of (large) shareholders and senior managers/the company board. This concentration of power is one reason why issues of corporate governance continue to be controversial; those currently excluded from strategic decision making may prefer a corporation to pursue different objectives. The essential difficulty is strategic failure: concentration of strategic decision-making power in the hands of an elite implies a failure to govern production in the interest of the community at large. To avoid such failure, an obvious possibility is to search for ways of democratising governance. The free market cannot be relied upon because of the ubiquity of imperfections, and regulation is ultimately restricted; democracy of its essence requires a change in the nature of corporate governance from within, impossible via regulation from without.
The design of appropriate company law is one policy option but time is needed to develop and evolve suitable changes, learning from experience. Meanwhile, it is necessary to find more immediate ways forward, steps that will complement a strategy to evolve the requisite, fundamental change. Democratically controlled public agencies can be vested with the responsibility and ability to monitor firms' strategy, and to secure effective representation of the public interest when corporations' strategic decisions are made. One possibility is the empowerment of appropriate regulatory offices for particular sectors. In the more specific case of mergers in England, for example, the Competition Commission appears to have the flexibility to perform an appropriate role. We suggest that in all countries and across all sectors, the willingness and determination to adopt and refine such roles is essential. That is the public interest in corporate governance.
